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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., a corporation, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
COLONIAL FORD, INC., 
Defendant, 
and 
LEGRANDE L. BELNAP and 
DORIS BELNAP, 
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 15745 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in favor 
of plaintiff/respondent as against defendants/appellants LeGrande 
L. Belnap and Doris Belnap by the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, 
District Judge, sitting without jury. Default judgment had 
been previously entered against defendant Colonial Ford, Inc. 
No appeal was taken from that judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants LeGrande L. Belnap and Doris Belnap 
have filed this appeal seeking reversal of judgment of the 
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trial court entered in favor of respondent First Sec 't 
' uri y Bank 
of Utah, N.A. It is respondent's position that the lower 
court' 
decision should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At all relevant times prior to September 14, 1976, 
defendant Colonial Ford, Inc. held a checking account at the 
Sugar House Branch of respondent, First Security Bank of Utah, , 
N .A. (R. 209.) Appellants LeGrande and Doris Belnap were 
respectively President and Vice President of the corporation. 
(R. 192, 171.) They were also its major shareholders. (R. ln.' 
Prior to September 14, 1976, the corporate checkin; 
account became overdrawn in the approximate sum of $57,000. 
(R. 209.) As a result of the overdraft the manager of the 
Sugar House Branch of the Bank, Ronald Fulkerson, contacted Mrs. 
Belnap by telephone and requested that she arrange for payment 
of the overdraft. (R. 209, 211.) Eventually, representatiws 
of Colonial Ford and of the Bank met on September 10, 1976. 
Present at the meeting were David Slater, an officer of Coloniai 
Ford, Kenneth Rothey, Colonial Ford's attorney, Mr. Fulkerson, 
and the branch's assistant manager, William Allen. (R. 213.) 
At the meeting the bank officers proposed that t~ 
overdraft be paid by means of a promissory note signed by 
Colonial Ford and a guaranty signed by the Belnaps. (R. 161, 
216, 239.) 
At trial there was some conflict in the testimony 
of the witnesses as to the nature of the guaranty. Rothey 
testified that the guaranty was one of collection. (R. 161.) 
-2-
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Fulkerson and Allen testified that the terms of the guaranty 
were not discussed. (R. 216-218.) Fulkerson further testified 
that he showed Rothey the standard guaranty form used by the 
Bank which he intended to use in this transaction. (R. 216-217.) 
Fulkerson also testified that prior to this action he was unaware 
that a guaranty could be conditional. (R. 218.) 
On September 14, 1976, Fulkerson arranged with 
Rothey or with the Belnaps to deliver the documents which he 
had prepared. (R. 218-225.) He personally delivered the docu-
ments to the Belnaps at the offices of Colonial Ford. (R. 225.) 
When he arrived Mrs. Belnap asked Fulkerson if the documents he 
was carrying were those which she had discussed with her attorney. 
He responded that they were. (R. 225.) Fulkerson further 
explained that one of the documents he had brought was a 
"personal guaranty". (R. 225.) 
Fulkerson observed that Mr. Belnap examined the 
guaranty and other documents before he signed them. (R. 226.) 
The guaranty itself bears the word "GUARANTY" in bold face 
type at the top of the form. (Exhibit P-2.) 
Defendant Colonial Ford subsequently defaulted in 
making its payments under the note. Respondent thereupon brought 
this action seeking judgment against both Colonial Ford under 
the note and against the Belnaps under the guaranty. Defendant 
Colonial Ford failed to answer respondent's Complaint and 
default judgment was entered. (R. 12.) Appellants' Answer to 
plaintiff's Complaint (R. 14-16) besides a general denial of 
-3-
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the allegations of the Complaint set up the twin defenses of 
lack of consideration and fraud. (R. 15, Third Defense, para-
graph 3.) 
On January 30, 1978, the Hon. David K. Winder, 
Law and Motion Judge, pre-tried the case. As required by the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, respondent's counsel prepared a propo;-
pre-trial order, a copy of which was personally delivered~ 
appellants' then-attorney, Mr. Rothey. After reviewing the 
order, Judge Winder signed it on February 1, 1978. (R. 107.) 
In the order Judge Winder acknowledged that the unresolved is~ 
of law related to the defense of fraud raised by appellants in 
their Answer. (R. 106-107, paragraph VI.) The order, which 
had been tacitly approved by appellants' counsel, contained no 
indication that appellants wished to raise the issue of mistake. 
On the morning of the trial appellants' counsel 
moved to strike the pre-trial order -- primarily in an effort tc 
allow Mr. Rothey to testify. (He was not one of the witnesses 
listed in the order.) (R. 140.) Both counsel agreed to the 
striking of the order, whereupon the trial judge reframed the 
issues as defined by both counsel. Based upon his examination 
of the discarded pre-trial order and upon his discussion wi~ 
counsel, the court conducted the following dialogue with bo~ 
attorneys: 
THE COURT: ... and based upon the 
allegations of fraud, the ultimate determina-
tion to be made is whether or not that 
guarantee [sic] dated the fourteenth of 
September, 1976, is valid. Will you stipu-
late that that's the issue actually? 
MR. KLEMM: Yes, your Honor. 
-4-
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MR. GUNN: Yes, your Honor .... 
(R. 150-151.) 
(R. 152.) 
THE COURT: So the ~laintiff has made the 
prima facie case by the introduction of the 
promissory note and the guarantee [sic]. All 
you seek to do in this case is to avoid the 
guarantee [sic] by the allegation of fraud. 
Now does that boil it down to what we are 
talking about today? 
MR. KLEMM: I think so, yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Gunn? 
MR. GUNN: Yes. I agree, your Honor. 
In this same conference, which occurred prior to 
trial, the court also considered the question of whether appellants 
had pleaded the issue of fraud with sufficient particularity. 
The court ruled that appellants' pleadings were insufficient but 
granted them leave to file an Amended Answer at the time of 
trial. (R. 143.) 
At the commencement of the trial appellants submitted 
their Amendment setting forth their allegation of fraud with 
particularity. (R. 109-110.) The Amended Answer contained 
no allegation of unilateral or mutual mistake. (Id.) 
During the course of the trial appellants never 
once stated that they were attempting to show mistake in the 
formation of the contract or that mistake was an issue upon 
which they would rely. (See Transcript of the trial proceedings, 
R. 155-244.) It was only after both sides had rested, during 
oral argument, that appellants for the first time raised the issue 
of mistake and requested that the court permit them to amend 
-5-
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their twice-amended answer to raise this issue as ff' an a irmatb,, 
defense. (R. 249.) The court denied appellants' motion and 
subsequently entered judgment in respondent's favor. (Id., R .. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED APPELLANTS' MOTJ'ON TO 
AMEND ITS ANSWER TO RAISE THE AFFIRMATIVE ISSUE OF MISTAKE 
After both sides at trial had rested appellants 
moved to amend their Answer to raise the affirmative defense oi 
mistake. (R. 249.) This motion was denied. Appellants now 
base their appeal from the adverse judgment below solely upon 
the alleged error of the trial court in failing to grant their 
motion. Appellants contend that the court's denial of their 
motion was in error because they were entitled to amend as a 
matter of law {Point I of Appellants' Brief), and because even 
if the granting of their motion was discretionary, it was 
an abuse of discretion to fail to grant their motion. (Point 
II of Appellants' Brief.) Respondent will demonstrate with 
this Brief that appellants' contentions contradict established 
principals of law. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED AS 
A MATTER OF LAW TO GRANT APPELLANTS' MOTION 
Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, sets 
forth the circumstances under which a pleading may be amended 
to conform to the evidence. It states, in part: 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties, they shall be treated in all respects 
as if they had been raised in the pleadings. 
-6-
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Appellants correctly point out that this rule mandates the 
granting of leave to amend in those cases where the court finds 
that an issue has been tried by express or implied consent. 
From this fact appellants erroneously conclude that the court 
below should have granted their motion to amend. Such a position 
assumes a fact not in evidence; namely, that the issue of 
mistake was tried by the express or implied consent of respondent. 
An examination of the record and of the pleadings 
fails to disclose any instance in which respondent expressly 
agreed to try the issue of mistake. Indeed, appellants fail 
to direct the court's attention to any such express consent. 
Instead, appellants state that the issue of mistake was tried 
by the implied consent of respondent and that such consent is 
shown by the fact that respondent failed to object to intro-
duction of appellants' testimony to the effect that they believed 
they were signing a document different from the one which they 
actually signed. (See page 8 of Appellants' Brief.) The issue 
which appellants thus raise is this: Did respondent impliedly 
consent to trial of the issue of mistake by failing to object 
to appellants' testimony that they thought that they were signing 
a document different in character than that whi~h they actually 
signed? An examination of cases which have dealt with this 
issue indicates that the answer to this question is "no"· 
Rule lS(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is 
identical to Rule lS(b) of the Utah Rules. Concerning this rule 
Professor Moore has stated: 
-7-
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The purpose of an amendment to conform to 
proof is to bring the pleadings in line with 
the actual issues upon which the case was 
~ried; therefore an amendment after judgment 
is not permissible which brings in some 
entirely extrinsic issue or changes the 
theory on which the case was actually tried 
even though there is evidence in the record' 
-- introduced as relevant to some other 
issue -- which would support the amendment. 
This principal is sound, since it cannot be 
fairly said that there is an implied consent 
to try an issue where the parties do not 
squarely recognize it as an issue in the 
trial. 
3 Moore's Federal Practice, paragraph 15.13 [2], pp. 15-171 to 
15-172. 
An excellent illustration of the above rule can 
be found in Bettes v. Stonewall Insurance Company, 480 F.2d 
92 (5th Cir. 1973). There, Bettes had brought an action agains' 
Stonewall for payment of benefits under an insurance policy. 
Stonewall raised the issue of misrepresentation as a defense 
to enforcement of the policy. At trial, after the parties had 
rested and the jury had been charged, Bettes sought to amend fr, 
pre-trial order to permit him to raise the issue of whether 
Stonewall, as required by its policy, had notified him that it 
would refuse to be bound by the terms of the policy because of 
the alleged misrepresentation. As with appellants here, Bettes 
argued that because he had been permitted to introduce evidence 
relevant to both the issues of misrepresentation and notice 
without objection of Stonewall, under Rule 15 (b), Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the trial court had erred in failing to 
grant his motion. Id.at 94. In rejecting Bettes' argument 
the court of appeals stated: 
-8-
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Bett~s ~laims that certain evidence offered 
by.him is so particularly and uniquely appro-
priate to the issue of notice that Stonewall's 
lack of ?bjection constituted implied consent 
for the issue to be tried, despite its omission 
from the pre-trial order. 
At no time during the trial was a request made 
for an amendment of the pleadings to conform 
to the ~vi~ence, but Bettes correctly notes 
that this is not necessarily fatal to his 
argument. [Citation omitted.) Instead, 
the death knell for his argument results from 
a careful reading of the record which dis-
closes no evidence that Stonewall gave any 
consent -- express, implied, or otherwise --
to trying this issue. Bettes' evidence did 
not pertain solely to the issue of notice, 
but had general relevance to the entire 
defense of misrepresentation. [Citations 
omitted.) Furthermore, for an issue allegedly 
tried by consent, mention of it was conspicuously 
absent at the charge conference, in the argu-
ments of both counsel to the jury, and in 
charge to the jury. As such, without warning 
that this evidence was being offered to prove 
a new issue, its admission without objection 
cannot be said to be "implied consent" within 
the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(b). 
Id. at 94-95. 
Respondent has been unable to find any Utah cases 
which specifically deal with the question of whether failure to 
object to the admission of evidence relevant to an unpleaded 
issue comprises consent to trial of that issue. However, the 
holding of this court in Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., 1 Utah 2d 
175, 264 P.2d 279 (1953), indicates that the rule in this state 
is that more is required for a showing of consent than the mere 
admission of evidence. There, plaintiff, a former employee of 
defendant, brought suit against defendant for claimed damages for 
breach of an express contract of employment. The trial court 
found that there had been no express contract but entered judgment 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in plaintiff's favor on a theory of quantum meruit, even thour 
the latter theory had never been raised by plaintiff. 
this Court reversed the judgment of the lower court. 
explaining its reason for doing so, the Court d h ma e t e follow 
pertinent statement: 
[A) defendant must be extended every reasonable 
opportunity to prepare his case and to meet an 
adversary's claims. Also he must be protected 
against surprise and be assured equal oppor-
tunity and facility to present and prove 
countercontentions, -- else unilateral justice 
and injustice would result sufficient to 
raise serious doubts as to constitutional due 
process guaranties. 
Here the record indicates that the plaintiff 
had an express contract in mind, not one 
implied in law. Plaintiff sought no change 
in theory by way of pleading or proof. We 
believe an injustice would result if the rule 
were interpreted to charge the defendant with 
liability under quantum meruit, an issue he 
was never called upon to meet. 
Id. at 177, 264 P.2d at 280. 
Although the court's decision in Taylor v. E. M. 
Royle Corp. does not specifically state that evidence relevan 
to the issue of quantum meruit was admitted without objection 
at trial, it is reasonable to assume that such was the case, 
since the elements for breach of express contract and for 
quantum merui t are very similar. Nonetheless, the court four 
that the trial court had acted improperly in entering judgmer 
in plaintiff's favor on a theory he had not pleaded. 
Similarly, in National Farmers Union Property and 
Casualty Co. v. Thompson. 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 249 (1955), 
court refused to find in defendant's testimony as to the val 
-10-
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of a building any consent to trial of that issue where plaintiff 
in his complaint had alleged a different value figure and 
defendant had admitted the allegation as to value in his answer. 
Plaintiff contended that because defendant had testified at 
trial as to a different valuation of the building, he had 
consented to a reconsideration of that issue. This Court 
disagreed, saying: 
Notwithstanding all of our efforts to 
eliminate technicalities and liberalize 
procedure, we must not lose sight of the 
cardinal principle that under our system 
of justice, if an issue is to be tried and 
a party's rights concluded with respect 
thereto, he must have notice thereof and an 
opportunity to meet it. This is recognized 
in Rule 15(b) which recites that such 
liberal amendments shall be allowed if the 
issue is tried "by express or implied consent 
of the parties." It does not appear that 
there was any such consent to try the 
issue of the value of the building. 
Id. at 13, 286 P.2d at 253. 
A different result was reached in General Insurance 
Co. of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corporation, 545 P.2d 
502 (Utah 1976), cited by appellants in their Brief. There 
this Court permitted a defendant to amend his answer at trial 
to deny the allegation in plaintiff's Complaint that a certain 
indemnity agreement had been executed by defendant for considera-
tion. Defendant's answer had initially failed to admit or deny 
the relevant allegation in plaintiff's Complaint with the result 
that the allegation was deemed admitted. The court held that 
~ since plaintiff had failed to object to admission of evi-
dence showing lack of consideration, he had consented to trial 
-11-
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of that issue. Id. at 506. 
At first glance it may appear that there exists 
an inconsistency between the results in General Insurance of 
America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., .§.~~' on the one hand and 
Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., and National Farmers Union v. 
Thompson, supra, on the other, since in the former case leave. 
amend was granted but entry or modification of judgment based 
upon unpleaded issues was discouraged in the latter two cases. 
In reality, all three cases support the rule that "an amendmen: 
after judgment is not permissible which brings in some entiu~ 
extrinsic issue or changes the theory on which the case was 
actually tried, even though there is evidence in the record --
introduced as relevant to some other issue -- which would 
support the amendment." 3 Moore's ~!15.13[2], supra. In the 
General Insurance Co. case, supra, defendants proffer of evidei 
as to lack of consideration in executing the indemnity agree-
ment could only have been interpreted as going to the issue of 
lack of consideration. By contrast, in the Taylor case, supra, 
evidence as to services rendered and as to damages would be 
relevant to both the theory of breach of express contract and 
to that of quantum meruit. 
And in National Farmers Union evidence of value 
was presented by the party not seeking to raise that issue, the 
in General Insurance Co., the adverse party had notice that t~ 
cl t · · · ssue for party subsequently seeking amen men was raising an l 
which amendment could be sought, but in Taylor and National 
Farmers Union the adverse party had no such notice. It folloi:c 
-12-
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that far frora rejecting the rule set forth in Moore's and 
Bettes v. Stonewall Insurance Co., supra, the Utah court accepts 
the rule that the adverse party's failure to object to admission 
of evidence relating to a subsequently raised issue does not 
necessarily show his consent to trial of that issue. 
In the instant action appellants contend that 
respondent's failure to object to the testimony of appellants 
that they were laboring under an incorrect impression as to 
the contents of the documents they signed shows that respondent 
consented to trial of the issue of mistake. As discussed above, 
this argument betrays an incomplete understanding of the law. 
The true rule as set forth by Moore, supra, is that there can 
be no implied consent to try an issue "where parties do not 
squarely recognize it as an issue in the trial." 3 Moore's 
1115.13 [2], supra. 
In the instant case the sole issues raised by 
appellants in their pleadings and in their pre-trial stipula-
tion as to issues were (1) lack of consideration and (2) fraud. 
An examination of the elements of fraud reveals that it would 
have been possible for appellants to have adduced evidence 
relevant to both mistake and fraud. 
follows: 
This Court has defined the elements of fraud as 
(1) That a representation was made; (2) 
concerning a presently existing material 
fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the 
representor either (a) knew to be false, or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
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~uch representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; 
(6) that the other party, acting reasonab_ly 
and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in 
fact rely upon it; ( B) and was thereby induced 
to act; ( 9) to his injury and damage. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 144-145, 247 P.2d 273, 274-275 
(1952). As indicated by the emphasized portion of the above 
quotation, in order to prove fraud, the party with the burden 
must show that he acted reasonably and in ignorance of the 
falsity of the misrepresentation. 
In the instant case appellants' proffer of proof 
as to their ignorance of the contents of the documents which 
they signed was perfectly consistent with their theory of f~~ 
-- specifically, the allegations contained in paragraphs 4 (f) 
and 4(g) of appellants' Amendment to Defendant's Answer to 
Complaint dated February 2, 1978, wherein appellants allege: 
The defendants acted reasonably in signing 
the guaranty agreement on the basis of the 
representation and were ignorant of its 
false nature at the time the guaranty was 
signed. 
The defendants relied upon the representa-
tion made by the said Ronald Fulkerson in 
signing the document. 
Furthermore, appellants' counsel specifically repre· 
sented to the court immediately prior to the trial that the so: 
issues to be tried were lack of consideration and fraud. In 
view of this representation and also in view of the fact thrt 
the evidence submitted was consistent with appellants' al~~l 
of fraud, it is clear that respondent did not and could not~ 
recognized that appellants' evidence was offered for the purpo: 
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of showing mistake. Thus, respondent cannot be said to have 
"consented" to trial of the issue of mistake. 
Furthermore, the question of whether or not there 
was consent to trial of a particular issue is left to the 
determination of the trial court. Thus, one court has stated: 
Once an issue has been tried by express or 
implied consent of the parties, Rule 15(b) 
requires it be treated as if raised by the 
pleadings. [Citations omitted.] Where the 
question is whether that is the case, however, 
the essential inquiry is the understanding 
of the parties as to whether the unpleaded 
issue was being contested. [Citations omitted.] 
The trial judge's answer to that inquiry is 
reviewable only for abuse of discretion. 
[Citations omitted.] He is in a far better 
position than we to determine the understanding 
under which the parties proceeded. Where the 
new issue or theory is raised only after 
trial, courts of appeals have been loathe to 
overturn the decision of the trial judge 
that it was not tried by consent. 
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 478 n.370 
(D.C. Cir. 1977). 
Since there is ample evidence to support the conclu-
sion that respondent did not consent to trial of the issue 
of mistake, the trial court clearly did not abuse its discre-
tion in refusing to grant appellants' leave to amend their 
Answer to raise this issue. 
B. THE LO\mR COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANTS' MOTION TO 
AMEND ITS ANSWER 
As discussed above, Rule 15(b}, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, requires the court to grant leave to amend a 
pleading to conform to the evidence if trial of the issue for 
which amendment is sought was consented to by the adverse party. 
-15-
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In addition, Rule lS(b) also permits the granting of leave to 
amend at the discretion of the trial court. In pertinent 
part, the rule states: 
If evidence is objected to at the trial 
on the ground that it is not within the 
issues made by the pleadings, the court 
may allow the pleadings to be amended 
when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the 
objecting party fails to satisfy the court 
that the admission of such evidence would 
prejudice him in maintaining his action 
or defense upon the merits. 
While conceding that the above provision gives the court dis-
cretion in determining whether a motion seeking leave to a~~ 
will be granted, appellants at the same time contend that t~ 
trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion. 
This Court has considered the issue raised by 
appellants in at least two cases. Thus, in Meyer v. Deluke, 
23 Utah 2d 74, 457 P.2d 966 (1969), the Court affirmed the 
decision of the trial court denying the motion of defendant, 
subsequent to judgment, seeking leave to amend his answer to 
raise the affirmative defense of usury. The Court said: 
In the instant action the defendants waived 
their statutory defense of usury; the facts 
were known to them at the time of their 
pleading and were, in fact, pleaded; they 
merely failed to assert the defense of usury. 
The only effect of their proposed amendment 
would be to withdraw their waiver of this 
statutory defense, not because of new 
evidence which was revealed at trial, but, 
because their asserted defenses were inade-
quate for them to prevail. Under these 
circumstances the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion by its refusal to permit an 
amendment to the pleadings. 
Id. at 78, 457 P.2d at 968-969. 
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Similarly, in Goeltz v. Continental Bank & Trust 
~' 5 Utah 2d 204, 299 P.2d 832 (1956), this court affirmed 
the order of the trial court denying defendant leave to amend 
its answer to plead the statute of limitations after all evidence 
had been presented at trial. In affirming the decision of the 
lower court this Court noted that all facts upon which the 
defense of limitations was based had been known to the defendant 
prior to trial and that no new evidence was discovered during 
the trial which would have made the defense available where 
it had not been available before. 
P. 2d at 834, 835. 
Id. at 208-209, 299 
As in Meyer v. Deluke and Goeltz v. Continental 
Bank, supra, prior to the time of trial appellants in this case 
were well aware of the facts upon which a claim of mistake could 
be based. Thus, under the holdings of the above cited cases, 
it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have 
denied appellants' motion for leave to amend. 
Conversely, respondent would have been prejudiced 
had the court granted appellants' motion. As discussed more 
fully below, this Court has recognized that unilateral mistake 
is not grounds for rescission of a contract if it would not be 
possible to give relief by way of rescission without serious 
prejudice to the other party. Ashworth v. Charlesworth, 119 
Utah 650, 231 P.2d 725 (1951). Similarly, it has been recognized 
that mistake is not grounds for avoiding a contract if the 
party against whom avoidance is sought can demonstrate that he 
did not know about the alleged mistake. 17 C.J.S. Contracts 
§143, p. 892. 
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In the instant action respondent wishes to represenc 
to this Court that it could have proved that it could not have 
been placed in the status quo if the contract were rescinded, 
and that it did not know about the alleged mistake. However, 
because the issue of mistake was first raised at the conclusic 
of the trial, after respondent had rested, respondent had 00 
opportunity to present its evidence as to the above issues. ~ 
follows that the trial court was correct in recognizing that 
respondent would have been prejudiced by the requested amend-
ment. For the same reason this Court should affirm the lower 
court's ruling. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE COURT RULED INCORRECTLY IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT APPELLANTS' MOTION, SUCH ERROR WAS HARMLESS 
It is a well-established doctrine of this Court that 
harmless error of the trial court is not grounds for reversal 
of its judgment. Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, pro· 
vides, in part: 
No error in either the admission or the 
exclusion of evidence, and no error or 
defect in any ruling or order or in any-
thing done or omitted by the court or b~ 
any of the parties, is ground for granting 
a new trial or otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal.to ta~e 
such action appears to the court inconsis-
tent with substantial justice. 
concerning the rule of "harmless error" this Court 
has stated that the judgment of the trial court will not be 
· l' party shows that the trial overturned unless the nonprevai ing 
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court committed error "which is substantial and prejudicial in 
the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its 
absence the result would have been different. . Hales v. 
Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 411, 415, 360 P.2d 822, 825 (1961); 
Rivas v. Pacific Finance Company, 16 Utah 2d 183, 186, 397 
P.2d 990, 992 (1964). 
An examination of the law of mistake clearly shows 
that if the lower court committed error in failing to grant 
appellants' motion, such error was harmless for the reason 
that even if appellants had been allowed to raise the issue 
of mistake, they could not have prevailed on such a theory. 
While it is not clear from the statements of 
appellants' counsel at trial whether appellants were alleging 
the existence of unilateral or mutual mistake, appellants' 
Brief makes it clear that they allege unilateral mistake. 
Thus, appellants state: 
The defendants are alleging that the guarantee 
[sic) that they signed should be rescinded 
because of their unilateral mistake. (Brief 
of Appellants, p. 14.) 
It is well established that unilateral mistake will not provide 
a basis for rescission or cancellation of an instrument except 
where it would be inequitable to enforce the contract. 
Equity will relieve a party from a unilateral 
mistake that was a result of fraud or duress 
or was accompanied by other special facts 
creating an independent equity on behalf of 
the mistaken person, such as inequitable conduct 
of the other party, but cancellation shall not 
be decreed upon a party whose conduct did not 
contribute to or induce the mistake and who 
will obtain no unconscionable advantage there-
from. 
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13 Am. Jur. 2d Cancellation of Instruments, § 32. 
Equity will not relieve one from the burden 
of a contract entered into by reason of a 
mistake resulting from negligence where the 
means of knowledge were easily accessible. 
Id. at 834. 
This Court has on at least two occasions defined ~ 
circumstances under which unilateral mistake may provide a 
basis for cancellation. In Ashworth v. Charlesworth, supra, 
the court ennunciated the following rule concerning cancellab 
of instruments based upon unilateral mistake: 
Equitable relief from a mutual mistake is 
frequently given by a reformation of the 
contract. But a contract will not be reformed 
for unilateral mistake. Equitable relief may, 
however, be given from a unilateral mistake by 
a rescission of the contract. Essential con-
ditions to such relief are: (1) The mistake 
must be of so grave a consequence that to 
enforce the contract as actually made would 
be unconscionable. (2) The matter as to which 
the mistake was made must relate to a material 
feature of the contract. (3) Generally the 
mistake must have occurred notwithstanding the 
exercise of ordinary diligence by the party 
making the mistake. (4) It must be possible 
to give relief by way of rescission without 
serious prejudice to the other party except 
the loss of his bargain. In other words, it 
must be possible to put him in status quo. 
Id. at 656, 231 P.2d at 726. See also, Davis v. Mulholland, ' 
Utah 2d 56, 57, 475 P.2d 834 (1970). 
In Ashworth v. Charlesworth, supra, plaintiff, a 
contractor, sued defendant, a subcontractor, who had repufil~ 
a contract for the painting of a bridge which plaintiff had 
constructed. The evidence showed that defendant had had t~ 
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opportunity to examine the plans and specifications and to read 
the contract before executing it. Based upon these facts the 
trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and found 
that defendant's mistaken belief as to the size of the bridge 
and as to the materials which defendant thought that plaintiff 
would supply did not comprise the type of unilateral mistake 
which would permit cancellation of the contract. In affirming 
the lower court's decision, this Court made the following state-
ment whose relevance to the instant action is obvious: 
From the foregoing facts and circumstances, we 
are of the opinion that the findings of the 
trial court to the effect that there was no 
mistake is not contrary to the weight of the 
evidence. He could have reasonably concluded 
that the claimed mistake was an afterthought. 
But even assuming the mistake was made by the 
defendants, they were guilty of such careless-
ness in not seeing what they should have seen 
and in not obtaining readily available infor-
mation that the trial court was not obliged 
to relieve them from the results of their own 
neglect. The fault, if any, in this case, appears 
to fall heavily upon the shoulders of the defend-
ants. 
Id. at 659, 231 P.2d at 728. 
Similarly, in Davis v. Mulholland, supra, this Court 
refused to rescind an option agreement containing the descrip-
tion of a certain parcel of land which was not the same parcel 
shown to the party seeking rescission. In affirming the lower 
court's judgment this Court stated: 
Plaintiff admits that he was given the correct 
legal description of the land actually owned by 
the defendant; and since the court found that 
there was no misrepresentation on the part of 
the defendant in pointing out the location of 
the land, the plaintiff cannot have a rescission 
of the option contract for the reason that if 
there was any mistake on his part, it was due 
entirely to his own negligence. 
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Id. at 58, 475 P.2d at 835. 
In the instant action, the findings of fact by t~ 
lower court make it clear that if there did exist a unila~u 
mistake, that mistake could have been avoided if appellantsl 
exercised ordinary care. In this regard the court's findina· 
"' 
of fact show the following examples of appellants' negligence 
and lack of due diligence: 
(1) At the time the Belnaps executed the guaran~ 
they knew or should have known that their attorney had not exo: 
or approved it. (R. 118, Finding 12.) 
(2) The Belnaps did not read the guaranty prior to 
or at the time of their signing it. (Finding 13.) 
( 3) The Belnaps were knowledgeable as to the legal 
significance of the guaranty. (Findings 14 and 15.) 
(4) At the time of the execution of the guaranty 
the Belnaps had not even taken the trouble to find out what 
agreement their attorney had reached with the Bank's repree~ 
tatives. (Findings 16.) 
Based upon the foregoing it is clear that even if 
appellants had been permitted to amend their answer at the ti~ 
of trial to raise the issue of unilateral mistake, and even if 
they had been successful in convincing the court that such 
mistake existed, their negligence was sufficient to prevent 
cancellation or rescission of the guaranty. It follows that 
the court's refusal to permit an amendment was at worst a 
harmless error. 
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COtlCLUS ION 
Appellants allege that the decision of the trial 
courl must be reversed because of its refusal at the conclusion 
of the trial to permit appellants to amend their answer to raise 
a new issue not previously raised in the pleadings or in the 
pre-trial conferences. Rule lS(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the relevant case law mandate that the decision 
of the trial court be affirmed unless it can be demonstrated 
that respondent consented to trial of the issue of mistake 
or that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
permit such amendment. The record on appeal clearly indicates 
that at no time did respondent ever consent to trial of the 
issue of mistake. Indeed, an examination of the record makes 
it clear that respondent first became aware that appellants 
intended to raise this issue near the conclusion of the trial. 
Correspondingly, inasmuch as respondent had no opportunity 
through the presentation of evidence to meet the allegation of 
mistake, respondent would have been prejudiced by the granting 
of appellants' motion. The trial court was therefore clearly 
correct in denying appellants' motion. 
In any case, even if appellants were otherwise 
entitled to the granting of their motion, the Findings of Fact 
of the trial judge and the record on appeal demonstrate that 
the alleged mistake was not of such a nature as to result in the 
cancellation or rescission of the guaranty in question. 
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. JI _, h. 
DATED this _Lb__ day of October, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
I 
By }/;-1H!V\) )) f.,w.J_ 
Steven H. Gunn 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
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